Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
By what principle does one majority have the right to rule, and another not? Secondly, while elections are generally transparent, why should forming a government be secretive? Is it because people believe, not only in majority rule, which may be fine, but also in (simple or weighted) majority voting, which is not so good? There are, after all, other more accurate voting systems by which can be identified the will of the majority; some of these latter methodologies are non-majoritarian. Now, if decisionmaking were to be based on a non-majoritarian voting procedure, the right to majority rule might be brought into question; indeed, majoritarianism might become obsolescent. Other forms of governance should therefore also be examined. Accordingly, this paper considers first, some of the deficiencies of a majoritarian polity; next, a more inclusive form of decision-making; then, majoritarian and nonmajoritarian types of governance; and lastly, a voting system by which a parliament may elect a national government. (original abstract)
Rocznik
Tom
Strony
90--109
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
- The de Borda Institute, Northern Ireland
Bibliografia
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- [3] Emerson Peter, 2012. Defining Democracy. Voting Procedures in Decision-Making, Elections and Governance. Heidelberg and Berlin: Springer. 143-50.
- [4] Schram Stuart, 1969. The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung. New York, Washington and London: Frederick A Praeger. 313.
- [5] Prunier Gérard, 1995. The Rwanda Crisis. London: C Hurst and Co.. 183.
- [6] Bogdanor Vernon, 1981. The People and the Party System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 92.
- [7] Emerson Peter, 2012. Defining Democracy. Voting Procedures in Decision-Making,Elections and Governance. Heidelberg and Berlin: Springer. 163-165.
- [8] Emerson Peter, (a). The original Borda count and partial voting. Social Choice and Welfare 40(2) (2013) 353-358.
- [9] Sigmund Paul, 1963. Nicholas of Cusa and Medieval Political Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 212.
- [10] Saari Donald, 2008, Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes. Social Choice Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 95.
- [11] McLean Iain, Urken Arnold, 1995. Classics of Social Choice, Michigan: Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press. 16-19.
- [12] Emerson Peter, 2007. Designing an All-Inclusive Democracy. Consensual Voting Procedures for use in Parliaments, Councils and Committees. Heidelberg and Berlin: Springer. 17.
- [13] Brown Kerry, 2011. Ballot Box China. London: Zed books. 18-19.
- [14] Mandela Nelson, 1994. Long Walk to Freedom. London: Little Brown and Company. 25.
- [15] Nyerere Julius, 1961. One-party Rule. In The Ideologies of the Developing Nations, pp. 196-211. Ed. Sigmund, Paul. New York, Washington and London: Frederick A Praeger. 197-8.
- [16] Musevei Yoweri, 1997. Sowing the Mustard Seed. The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda. London: Macmiillan. 200.
- [17] Black Duncan, 1958. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 180.
- [18] Taylor Rupert, 2009. The Injustice of Consociationalism. In Consociational Theory. Ed. Taylor, Rupert. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. 320.
- [19] Peter Emerson, International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences 10(2) (2014) 132-55.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171341665