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2011 | nr 170 Finanse - nowe wyzwania teorii i praktyki. Problemy wiodące | 28--46
Tytuł artykułu

Stabilność finansowa strefy euro. Implikacje dla Polski

Warianty tytułu
Financial Stability of Euro Zone. Implications for Poland
Języki publikacji
PL
Abstrakty
Struktura instytucjonalna strefy euro była pomyślana jako zabezpieczenie przed nieodpowiedzialną polityką fiskalną rządów. W rzeczywistości, z wyjątkiem Grecji, to nie rządy lecz banki komercyjne podejmowały nieodpowiedzialne decyzje, które zachwiały stabilnością finansową strefy euro. Kryzys bankowy i recesja spowodowały gwałtowny wzrost zadłużenia rządów. Wcześniejsze boomy kredytowe przyspieszyły natomiast proces różnicowania się konkurencyjności gospodarek wewnątrz strefy euro. W efekcie kraje strefy euro podzieliły się na nadwyżkowe, których gospodarki charakteryzuje chroniczna słabość konsumpcji, prowadząca do nadmiaru oszczędności krajowych i dużych nadwyżek handlowych, oraz deficytowe, w których wysokie tempo wzrostu akcji kredytowej i konsumpcji były przyczyną malejącej stopy oszczędności i utrzymywania się dużych deficytów w obrotach handlowych. (abstrakt oryginalny)
EN
The euro zone institutional structure was designed as a protection against government irresponsible fiscal policies. However, with the exception of Greece, it was not government but commercial banks irresponsible behaviour that endangered financial stability of the euro zone. It was only the banking crisis and the recession that caused the sharp rise in public debt in the euro zone countries. The crisis was preceded by unstable lending booms that accelerated differentiation of competitiveness among euro zone economies. This process produced a split within the euro zone into a group of surplus countries characterized by chronic weakness of the domestic demand resulting in excessive domestic savings and large trade surpluses and the group of deficit countries characterized by demand-led growth leading to low domestic savings and large trade deficits. (original abstract)
Twórcy
  • Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie
  • Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171371559

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