On the Core of a Cost Allocation Problem Under Asymmetric Information

• Autorzy: Yusuke Kamishiro
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

We study a cost allocation problem under asymmetric information, and show that the ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty. We also obtain a non-emptiness result for the incentive compatible coarse core, which is one concept of an interim core. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Costs; Information asymmetry

PL

Koszty; Asymetria informacji

• Czasopismo: Operations Research and Decisions
• Rocznik: 2015
• Tom: 25
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 17--32

Twórcy

autor

Yusuke Kamishiro

• Kanto Gakuin University

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5277/ord150102