Corporate Governance and Non-Executive Disclosures the Case Study of Some FTSE100 Companies

• Autorzy: Agnieszka Herdan , Magdalena M. Stuss

Warianty tytułu

Ład korporacyjny i zakres ujawniany informacji w dotyczących dyrektorów niewykonawczych studium przypadku wybranych firm FTSE100

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Corporate governance has become increasingly important phenomenon. The necessity of improvement the efficiency of the board of directors and appointment of executive directors (NEDs) has become significantly important. It is clear that NEDs play significant role in efficient corporate governance. They expertise and links can bring benefits to the firm. But the full engagement of the NED is required to take full advantage of those attributes. (original abstract)

Ład korporacyjny staje się coraz bardziej istotnym zjawiskiem. Konieczność poprawy efektywności zarządu i powołania dyrektorów niewykonawczych (NEDs) jest dziś niezwykle szczególnie waży. Oczywiste jest, że NEDs odgrywają kluczową rolę w efektywnym nadzorze korporacyjnym. Ich wiedza i powiązania biznesowe mogą przynieść korzyści firmie. Wymaga to jednak pełnego zaangażowanie ze strony NED tak aby w pełni wykorzystać z posiadane przez nich atrybuty. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Corporate governance; Case study; Board of directors; Enterprise supervision

PL

Ład korporacyjny; Studium przypadku; Zarząd; Nadzór nad przedsiębiorstwem

• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Ekonomiczno-Społecznej w Ostrołęce
• Rocznik: 2016
• Numer: nr 23
• Strony: 143--156

Twórcy

autor

Agnieszka Herdan

• University of Greenwich, London, United Kingdom

autor

Magdalena M. Stuss

• Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Bibliografia

• 1. Adams R, Ferreira D., Theory of friendly board, The Journal of Finance, 2007, Vol. 62 , Issue 1, p. 217-250
• 2. Adams R., Hermalin B.E., Weisbach M.S., The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, Journal of Economic Literature 2010, Vol. 48., Issue 1, p. 58-107
• 3. Barrow C., The role of non-executive directors in high tech smes, Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 2001, Vol. 1, Issue 2, p.34 - 36
• 4. Byrd J., Hickman K., Pay for performance: does disclosure matter?Journal of Finance, 1995, Vol. 21, Issue 2, p.24-30
• 5. Cadbury A., Report on the committee offinancial aspects of corporate governance, 1992, www.ecgi.org.
• 6. Chen J., Ownership structure as corporate governance mechanism; Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies, Economics of Planning, 2001, p.34-53
• 7. Clarke T., The contribution of non-executive directors to the effectiveness of corporate governance,Career Development International, 1988, Vol. 3, Issue.3, p.118 - 124
• 8. Conyon M.J., The disclosure of UK boardroom pay: the March 2001 DTI proposals, Corporate Governance An International Review, 2001, Vol. 9, Issue 4, p.276 - 285
• 9. Dulewicz V, Gay K, Taylor B, What makes an outstanding chairman? Findings from the UK nonexecutive director of the year awards, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2006,Vol. 15, Issue 6, p. 1056 -1069
• 10. Fama E.F.,Agency problems and the theory of the firm, Journal of Political Economy, 1980, Vol. 88, p.288-307
• 11. Frederick R., Disclosure: A corporate governance tool that really works, The Third Meeting of the Russian Corporate governance roundtable, OECD, 2000, www.oecd.org
• 12. Greenbury R., Directors' Remuneration: Report of a Study GroupChaired by Sir Richard Greenbury, Gee and Co: London, 1995, p. 9 - 45
• 13. Hampel R., Committee on Corporate Governance- Final Report, Gee Publication, 1998
• 14. Harris M., Raviv A., A Theory of Board Control and Size, The Review of Financial Studies, 2010, Vol 21, Issue 4, p. 1797-1832
• 15. Healy P., Palepu K., Information asymmetry, corporate governance disclosure and the capital markets: A review of the empirical literature, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2001, Vol. 31, p.405 - 440
• 16. Higgs D., Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors, The Department of Trade and Industry, p. 27 - 31, www.ecgi.org
• 17. ICGN, Best practices for executive and director remunerations, International corporate governance network, 2003
• 18. Kakabadse N., Kakabadse A.K., Kouzmin A., Board Governance and Company Performance: Any Correlations?Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 2001,Vol. 1, Issue 1, p. 24-30
• 19. Kanda H., Disclosure and Corporate Governance: A Japanese Perspective, Corporate Governance in Asia , A Comparative Perspective, OECD 01 August 2001, www.oecd.org
• 20. Leftwich R., Market failure fallacies and accounting information, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1980, Vol. 2, p. 193-211
• 21. Lehn, K.M., Patro, S., and Zhao, M., Determinants of the Size and Composition of U.S. Corporate Boards: 1935-2000, Financial Management, 2009, Vol. 38, Issue 4, p. 747 - 780
• 22. O`Higgins E., Non-executive Directors on Boards in Ireland: co-option, characteristics and contributions, 2002, Corporate Governance; An International Review, Volume 10, Issue 1, p. 19-28
• 23. Pass C., Corporate governance and the role of non-executive directors in large UK companies: an empirical study,Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, 2004, Vol. 4, Issue 2, p.52 - 63
• 24. Pass C., Non-executive directors and the UK's new combined code on corporate governance, Business Strategy Series, 2008, Vol. 9, Issue: 6, p.291 - 296
• 25. Raheja C. G., Determinants of board size and composition: A theory of corporate boards, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 40, Issue 2, p. 283-306
• 26. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance 2003, Financial Reporting Council, 2003, www.frc.org.uk
• 27. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance 2008, Financial Reporting Council 2008, www.frc.org.uk
• 28. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance 2010, Financial Reporting Council, 2010, www.frc.org.uk
• 29. The Financial Reporting Council's, Guidance on Board effectiveness, 2011, www.frc.org.uk
• 30. Watts R., Zimmerman J., Positive accounting theory, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1986
• 31. Zattoni A., Cuomo F., How Independent, Competent and Incentivized Should Non-executive Directors Be? An Empirical Investigation of Good Governance Codes, 2010, Volume 21, Issue 1, p.63 - 79
• 32. Zingales L., Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm, EWTS1998, www.ewts.at