Bank centralny jako pożyczkodawca ostatniej instancji na przykładzie Anglii i USA

• Autorzy: Marian Turek

Warianty tytułu

The Central Bank in the United Kingdom and the USA as a Lender of Last Resort

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

W niniejszym artykule prześledzono ewolucję pożyczkodawcy ostatniej instancji i jej wdrażanie - od XIX w. poprzez kryzys w 2008 r. Stwierdzono, że zazwyczaj najbardziej wpływowi ekonomiści "walczą według strategii ostatniej wojny"; używając sformułowań z wytycznych politycznych, które skutecznie radziły sobie podczas ostatniego kryzysu lub w niektórych przypadkach ostatnich dwóch lub trzech kryzysów. Dotyczy to nawet najważniejszego teoretyka zajmującego się teorią kredytodawców ostatniej instancji, Waltera Bagehota, który zajmował się sposobami radzenia sobie z kryzysami finansowy-mi, które dotknęły Wielką Brytanię między zakończeniem wojen napoleońskich a kryzysem 1866 r. Walka według zasad ostatniej wojny może pozostawić ekonomistów nieprzygotowanych do skutecznego sprostania wyzwaniom następnej, nowej wojny.(abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The article presents selected theoretical views on the role of the central banks of the United Kingdom (the Bank of England) and of the USA (the Federal Reserve) as lenders of last resort from the mid-nineteenth century until the banking crisis of 2008. Of particular interest are the views of Walter Bagehot, who examined the economic crisis of his own day in Britain. With regard to economic crises in the USA, the theoretical achievements of Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz and Ben Bernanke have been widely recognised, especially in the recovery from the crisis of 2008.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Banki centralne; Pożyczki bankowe; Banki

EN

Central banks; Bank loans; Banks

• Czasopismo: Prace Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Bankowej w Gdańsku
• Rocznik: 2018
• Tom: 52 Rynki finansowe, inwestycje i finanse : aktualne problemy
• Strony: 33--57

Twórcy

autor

Marian Turek

• Wyższa Szkoła Bankowa w Gdańsku

Bibliografia

• Bagehot W. (1986), Some Articles on the Depreciation of Silver and on Topics Connected with It. London: H. S. King & Co. Reprinted in Norman S. Stevas, (ed.), Collected Works of Walter Bagehot, The Economist and Harvard University Press, London & Boston 1965-1968.
• Bagehot W. (1984), Lombard Street: A description of the Money Market. London: William Clowes and Sons, Limited.
• Baring Sir F. (2007), Observations on the Establishment of the Bank of England; and on the Paper Circulation of the Country, [in:] Forrest H. Capie, Geoffrey E. Wood (eds), The Lender of Last Resort, London: Routlcdge.
• Bernanke B. (2013), The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Bernanke B. (2000), Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
• Bernanke B. (1983), Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression. The American Economic Review.
• Bignon V., M. Flandreau M., and S. Ugolini S. (2012), Bagehot for Beginners: The Making of Lender-of-last-resort Operations in the Mid-nineteenth Century. Economic History Review.
• Cagan P. (1965), Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of Money, 1875-1960. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
• Calomiris Ch. W. and G. Gorton. (199 U, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation. Financial Markets and Financial Crises, [in:] R. Glenn Hubbard (ed.), A National Bureau of Economic Research Project Report; Chicago and London; University of Chicago Press.
• Capie F. (2002), The Bank of England as a Mature Central Bank. The Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688-1914. Donald Winch and Patrick O'Brien (eds) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Capie F., and Wood G.E. (2006), The Lender of Last Resort. New York: Routledge.
• Diamond D.W., and Dybvig P. H. (1983), Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity. Journal of Political Economy.
• Eichengreen B. (2012), Economic History and Economic Policy. Journal of Economic History.
• Ennis H.M. and Keister T. (2009), Bank Runs and Institutions: The Perils of Intervention. The American Economic Review.
• Fisher I. (1933), The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions. Econometrica 1.
• Fisher I. (1932), Booms and Depressions: Some First Principles. New York Adelphi:
• Flannery M.J. (2010), Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with Contingent Capital Certificates. CAREFIN Research Paper No. 04/2010. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1798611.
• Friedman M. (1974), Interview with Milton Friedman. Franklin National. Sound recording 146, Rose D. Friedman (ed.). Instructional Dynamics, Online Archive of California.
• Friedman M. (1970), Interview with Milton Friedman, Penn Central Bankruptcy. Sound recording 53., Rose D. Friedman (ed.), Instructional Dynamics, Online Archive of California.
• Friedman M. and Friedman R.D. (1980), Free to Choose: A Personal Statement. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
• Friedman, M. and A.J. Schwartz A.J. (1986), Has Government any Role in Money? Journal of Monetary Economics.
• Friedman M. (1986), The Failure of the Bank of United States: A Reappraisal: A Reply. Explorations in Economic History.
• Friedman M. (1963), A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960. National Bureau of Economic Research. Studies in business cycles. Vol. 12. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Goodfriend M. (2012), The Elusive Promise of Independent Central Banking: Keynote Speech. Monetary and Economic Studies.
• Goodhart Ch.A.E. (1999), Myths about the Lender of Last Resort. International Finance.
• Gorton G. (2012), Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why we Don't See Them Coming. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Gorton G. (1985), Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States. Journal of Economic History.
• Grossman R.S. (2013), WRONG: Nine Economic Policy Disasters and What We Can Learn from Them. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Grossman R.S. (2007), Fear and Greed: The Evolution of Double Liability in American Banking, 1865-1930. Explorations in Economic History.
• Grossman R.S. (2001), Double Liability and Bank Risk Taking. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
• Grossman R.S. and Imai M. (2013), Contingent Capital and Bank Risk-Taking among British Banks before the First World War. Economic History Review.
• Grossman R.S. and Imai M. (2010), Contingent Capital and Risk Taking: Evidence from Britain's Banks 1878-1912. Vox.eu, 7 September 2010. http://www.voxcu.org/article/liabiIity- and-excessive-risk-taking-historical-evidence-britain-s-banks.
• Hawtrey R.G. (1932), The Art of Central Banking. London, New York, etc.: Longmans, Green and Co.
• Humphrey T.M. (1992), Lender of Last Resort, [in:] The Palgrave Dictionary of Money & Finance, Peter Newman, Murray Milgate and John Eatwell (eds), Vol. 2, London and Basingstoke, United Kingdom: The Macmillan Press Limited.
• Humphrey T.M. (1989), Lender of Last Resort: The Concept in History. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review.
• James J.A., McAndrews J., and. Weiman D.F. (2013), Wall Street and Main Street: The Macro- economic Consequences of New York Bank Suspensions, 1866-1914. Cliometrica.
• Jefferys J.B. (1946), The Denomination and Character of Shares, 1855-1885. Economic History Review.
• Kindleberger Ch. Poor (1989), Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. Rev ed. New York: Basic Books.
• Kindleberger Ch. Poor (1984), A Financial History of Western Europe. London: Allen and Unwin.
• Kindleberger Ch. Poor and Aliber R.Z. (2011), Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Lucia J.L. (1985), The Failure of the Bank of United States: A Reappraisal. Explorations in Economic History.
• Meltzer Allan H. (2013), What's Wrong with the Fed? What Would Restore Independence? Cato Journal.
• Meltzer A.H. (2003; 2009), A History of the Federal Reserve. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Minsky H.P (1982), Can 'It' Happen Again? New York: M.E. Sharp.
• Mints L.W. (1945), A History of Banking Theory in Great Britain and the United States. Chicago, 111.: University of Chicago Press.
• Mitchell W.C. (1941), Business Cycles and Their Causes. A New Edition of Mitchell's Business Cycles: Part III. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
• Nelson E. (2013), Friedman's Monetary Economics in Practice. Journal of International Money and Finance.
• O'Brien A.P. (1992), The Failure of the Bank of the United States: A Defense of Joseph Lucia: A Note. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking.
• Reinhart C.M., and Rogoff K.S. (2009), This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
• Schularick M. and Taylor A. M. (2012), Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises 1870-2008. American Economic Review.
• Schumpeter J.A. (1954), History of Economic Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Schwartz A. J. (1986), Real and Pseudo-financial Crises, [in:] Forrest Capie, Geoffrey E. (eds) Financial Crises and the World Banking System., Wood, New York; St. Martin's Press.
• Sorkin A.R. (2009), Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System from Crisis - and Themselves. New York: Viking. Kindle edition.
• Sprague O.M. W. (1909), The Proposal for a Central Bank in the United States: A Critical View. The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
• Temin P. (1989), Lessons from the Great Depression: The Lionel Robbins Lectures for 1989. Lionel Robbins lectures. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
• Temin P. (1976), Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression? New York: Norton.
• Trescott P. B. (1992), The Failure of the Bank of the United States, 1930: A rejoinder. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking.
• White E. N. (2010), Rethinking the Regulation of Banking: Choices or Incentives? Rutgers University.
• ---