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2019 | 101 | nr 157 | 167--200
Tytuł artykułu

Compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code : Can the Heterogeneous Implementation Be Explained?

Warianty tytułu
Zgodność z niemieckim Kodeksem ładu korporacyjnego : czy można wyjaśnić zróżnicowane podejście przedsiębiorstw do jego wdrożenia?
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
Starting with the Cadbury code in 1992, various national and international Corporate Governance (CG) codes have been issued all over the world. So far, empirical studies have revealed mixed results concerning the effects and outcomes of code implementation and thus supported the hypothesis of a 'one system does not fit all' approach in CG. Therefore, this paper empirically analyses influence factors on compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code for a large sample of 306 listed firms in 2015. We chose German companies because of the specific institutional settings in Germany, e.g., the strong influence of founder families on a firm's management or the relevance of debt financing. It is assumed that the country-specific institutional setting limits the transferability of results of US and UK studies. Thus, we used the German setting to derive relevant influence factors on Code compliance. In addition, we applied a more sophisticated measure of Code implementation than previous studies. Overall, we find a significant positive effect of ownership dispersion and firm size on Code compliance, whereas the other influence factors, e.g., family influence or the supervisory board's size, reveal the right direction of impact but not the required level of statistically significance. In contrast to institutional theory, we find a negative al-though statistically insignificant impact of the strength of foreign investors' influence on Code compliance. Overall, our results indicate that the institutional setting is not decisive for Code compliance. In-stead, we assume that the main rationale for Code compliance is not the reduction of agency conflicts but the alignment with peer group practices as indicated by the variable company size. Future research should investigate the peer effects on the level of Code compliance in detail. (original abstract)
Począwszy od Kodeksu Cadbury'ego z 1992 roku na świecie opracowano różne krajowe i międzynarodowe kodeksy ładu korporacyjnego (Corporate Governance - CG). Jak dotąd, badania empiryczne nie dostarczyły jednoznacznych rezultatów w zakresie efektów i wyników ich implementacji, popierając tym samym hipotezę, że "jeden system nie pasuje dla każdego" w odniesieniu do CG. W niniejszym artykule poddano analizie czynniki wpływające na wdrożenie zasad niemieckiego Kodeksu ładu korporacyjnego w 306 spółkach publicznych w 2015 roku. Badaniami objęto niemieckie spółki z uwagi na specyficzne uwarunkowania instytucjonalne charakterystyczne dla Niemiec, m.in. silny wpływ rodzin będących założycielami firm na procesy zarządcze czy istotne znaczenie finansowania przez zadłużenie. Przyjmuje się, że specyficzne dla danego kraju instytucjonalne uwarunkowania ograniczają możliwość bezpośredniego odniesienia uzyskanych wyników do dotyczących Stanów Zjednoczonych czy Wielkiej Brytanii. W artykule skoncentrowano uwagę na specyfice Niemiec, co pozwoliło zidentyfikować istotne czynniki wpływające na zgodność praktyki działających w tym kraju spółek z kodeksem CG. W badaniach zastosowano także bardziej wyrafinowaną metodę pomiaru stopnia wdrożenia zasad CG niż w przeprowadzonych do tej pory. Wyniki badań pozwalają stwierdzić znaczący pozytywny wpływ rozproszenia własności i wielkości firmy na zgodność z zasadami CG. Analiza większości innych czynników, takich jak m.in. zaangażowanie rodziny czy rozmiar rady nadzorczej pozwoliła stwierdzić, że mają one zakładany wpływ, ale nie mają wymaganego poziomu statystycznej istotności. W przeciwieństwie do założeń teorii instytucjonalnej w pracy wykazano negatywny, choć nieistotny statystycznie wpływ inwestorów zagranicznych na wdrożenie zasad CG. Wyniki badań wskazują więc, że instytucjonalne uwarunkowania nie mają kluczowego znaczenia dla tego procesu. Pozwalają jednak stwierdzić, że główną przesłanką stosowania zasad CG nie jest zmniejszenie konfliktu agencji, ale dostosowanie się do praktyk stosowanych przez podobne podmioty, na co wskazuje zmienna rozmiar spółki. Dalsze badania powinny w być ukierunkowane na dokładniejsze zbadanie wpływu porównywalnej grupy przedsiębiorstw na wdrożenie zasad CG. (abstrakt oryginalny)
Rocznik
Tom
101
Numer
Strony
167--200
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
  • Kiel University of Applied Sciences
autor
  • Kiel University of Applied Sciences
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
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Identyfikator YADDA
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