Warianty tytułu
The Unqualitative World by B. Gawecki
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
Celem niniejszej pracy jest przypomnienie artykułu (Gawecki B., Zarys realizmu ewolucyjnego, "Studia Filozoficzne", 1958, nr 5), poddanie go głębszej analizie, a przy okazji zaprezentowanie własnej koncepcji rzeczywistości bezjakościowej, zbliżonej w pewnym stopniu do teorii Gaweckiego. (fragment tekstu)
The paper refers to a conception of unqualitative world of Bolesław Gawęcki. Critical analysis of this theory led by the author gives an occasion to present his own model of unqualitative reality. In this model reality is shown as concentrations of the abilities to act, that is, centres of energy. The centres devoid of any qualities exist in dispositional states, changing all the time. These dispositional states are characterized by definite abilities to act on other centres. Changeability of dispositional states is a result of influences between energetical centres. The influences are reciprocal exchanges of energy between centers. Influences between definite dispositional states are constant; in this inner order of matter is expressed (laws of nature).
Cognizing subject is also an energetical centre. Cognitive process is an interaction between subject and other centres of energy. All qualities creating our picture of the world are an effect of this interaction, they do not exist objectively in external centres. As opposed to the "world for us", the "world in itself" is qualitatively undefined, but it has dispositional definiteness.
Unqualitativity of transcendental world establishes a specific dimension of a problem of its cognizability. If cognition is a construction of a subject reacting on influences of unqualitative centers of energy, comparing our picture of the world, as a complex of qualities, to the "world in itself" which has no qualities, has no sense and is impossible. Each different subject (that is also different dispositional state) will create a different picture of the world and a number of its possible appearances may be infinite, each one of them will be equal in rights and equally true.
So the world is cognizable for every on subject. Relativity and subjectivity of cognition do not mean unknowableness of the objective world. (original abstract)
Cognizing subject is also an energetical centre. Cognitive process is an interaction between subject and other centres of energy. All qualities creating our picture of the world are an effect of this interaction, they do not exist objectively in external centres. As opposed to the "world for us", the "world in itself" is qualitatively undefined, but it has dispositional definiteness.
Unqualitativity of transcendental world establishes a specific dimension of a problem of its cognizability. If cognition is a construction of a subject reacting on influences of unqualitative centers of energy, comparing our picture of the world, as a complex of qualities, to the "world in itself" which has no qualities, has no sense and is impossible. Each different subject (that is also different dispositional state) will create a different picture of the world and a number of its possible appearances may be infinite, each one of them will be equal in rights and equally true.
So the world is cognizable for every on subject. Relativity and subjectivity of cognition do not mean unknowableness of the objective world. (original abstract)
Słowa kluczowe
Rocznik
Tom
Numer
Strony
59--72
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
Bibliografia
- Armstrong D.: Materialistyczna teoria umysłu. Warszawa 1982, s. 395-405.
- Brzozowski S.: Idee. Warszawa 1903, s. 51-53.
- Droscher V.: Świat zmysłów. Warszawa 1971.
- Eilstein H.: O stylu filozofowania Leszka Kołakowskiego tudzież o "młodomarksowskiej" i "engelsowsko-leninowskiej" teorii poznania. "Studia Filozoficzne" 1959 nr 6.
- Gawecki B.: Zarys realizmu ewolucyjnego. "Studia Filozoficzne" 1958 nr 5, s. 95.
- Janiszewski L.: Narządy zmysłów zwierząt. Warszawa 1988.
- Kochański Z.: Poznanie jako subiektywne odbicie obiektywnej rzeczywistości. "Myśl Filozoficzna" 1957 nr 3.
- Kołakowski L.: Kultura i fetysze. Warszawa 1967, s. 58.
- Krajewski W.: Szkice filozoficzne. Warszawa 1963, s. 220.
- Narski I.: Dialektyczna sprzeczność i logika poznania. Warszawa 1981, s. 205.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
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