The Politico-institutional Foundation of Economic Transition in Central Asia: Lessons from China

• Autorzy: Joachim Ahrens

Warianty tytułu

Polityczno-instytucjonalne podstawy transformacji gospodarczej w Azji Środkowej: lekcje zaczerpnięte z Chin

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Central Asia is increasingly the focus of international attention because of its geopolitical and economic importance as well as its unsettled transition processes. Central Asian countries, i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, faced enormous challenges when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Overall, they have made rudimentary progress in opening up to the international community, creating market institutions, and building more inclusive, democratic political processes. Daunting challenges remain - reflected in the region's relatively low economic and human development indicators. While reforms to stabilize, liberalize and privatize the economy have been conducted in all countries except Turkmenistan, reforms of the institutional environment have been largely neglected. It is evident that the lack of effective institution building as well as rule enforcement in the economic and political realms represents one of the key weaknesses and drawbacks of transition. Hence, crafting adequate market institutions will be of utmost importance in the future. Applying the tools of the New Institutional Economics, this paper seeks to explore options for institutional reform in Central Asia and accounts for possible lessons from China. (original abstract)

Azja Środkowa w coraz większym stopniu przykuwa międzynarodową uwagę ze względu na swe znaczenie geopolityczne oraz gospodarcze, jak też nierozstrzygnięty proces transformacji. Kraje Azji Środkowej, jak np. Kazachstan, Kirgistan, Tadżykistan czy Uzbekistan, stanęły w obliczu ogromnych wyzwań, gdy rozpadł się Związek Sowiecki. Ogólnie rzecz biorąc, dokonały one elementarnego postępu, otwierając się na społeczność międzynarodową, budując instytucje rynkowe i tworząc bardziej spójne, demokratyczne procesy polityczne. Pozostały jednak zniechęcające wyzwania - odzwierciedlone w relatywnie niskich wskaźnikach rozwoju gospodarczego i społecznego regionu. Podczas gdy reformy ukierunkowane na stabilizację, liberalizację i prywatyzację gospodarki zostały przeprowadzone we wszystkich krajach poza Turkmenistanem, w dużym stopniu zaniedbano reformy środowiska instytucjonalnego. Jest oczywiste, iż brak budowy efektywnych instytucji, jak też brak egzekwowania prawa w sferze gospodarczej i politycznej stanowią jedną z podstawowych słabości i wad transformacji. Dlatego też stworzenie odpowiednich instytucji rynkowych będzie odgrywało najwyższą rolę w przyszłości. Wykorzystując narzędzia Nowej Ekonomii Instytucjonalnej, niniejszy artykuł przedstawia różne opcje reform instytucjonalnych w Azji Środkowej i prezentuje jednocześnie możliwe lekcje zaczerpnięte z Chin. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Institutions; Institutional changes; Political and systemic transformations

PL

Instytucje; Zmiany instytucjonalne; Przekształcenia ustrojowo-systemowe

• Czasopismo: Economic and Environmental Studies
• Rocznik: 2010
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 161--188

Twórcy

autor

Joachim Ahrens

• Private University of Applied Sciences Gőttingen and European Business School International University, Oestrich-Winkel, Germany

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