Kociołek i chochelka : formuła szacowania rozkładu mandatów metodą Jeffersona-D'Hondta

• Autorzy: Jarosław Flis , Wojciech Słomczyński , Dariusz Stolicki

Warianty tytułu

Pot And Ladle : a Formula for Estimating the Distribution of Seats Under the Jefferson-D'hondt Method

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Przedstawiamy prostą, acz nową formułę szacowania rozkładu mandatów i odchylenia od proporcjonalności dla systemów wyborczych, w których alokacja mandatów odbywa się metodą Jeffersona-D'Hondta (JDH). Bazuje ona wyłącznie na ogólnokrajowych udziałach głosów i ustalonych parametrach danego systemu wyborczego. Zaproponowany przez nas wzór wyjaśnia odchylenie od proporcjonalności jako zjawisko zależne zarówno od liczby partii, jak i od liczby okręgów wyborczych. Pokazujemy, że zapewnia on dobre przybliżenie podziału mandatów, nawet w przypadku niewielkich naruszeń leżących u jego podstaw założeń. W tym celu przeprowadziliśmy testy empiryczne naszego wzoru na danych wyborczych z wszystkich dziewięciu krajów członkowskich Unii Europejskiej, w których podział mandatów w wyborach parlamentarnych odbywa się metodą Jeffersona-D'Hondta. Omawiamy zastosowania naszej formuły do modelowania efektów przesunięć głosów, konsolidacji i fragmentacji partii, tzw. spoiler effects, inżynierii wyborczej, progów ustawowych oraz gerrymanderingu. Ponieważ nie wymaga ona znajomości wyników wyborów na poziomie okręgów, umożliwia łatwiejsze prowadzenie symulacji wyborczych z wykorzystaniem metody JDH. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

We propose a simple yet new formula for estimating national seat shares and quantifying seat biases in elections employing the Jefferson-D'Hondt (JDH) method for seat allocation. It is based solely on the national vote shares and fixed parameters of the given electoral system. The proposed formula clarifies the relationship between seat bias on the one hand, and the number of parties and the number of districts on the other. We demonstrate that the formula provides a good estimate of seat allocations in real-life elections even in the case of minor violations of the underlying assumptions. With that aim in mind, we have tested it for all nine EU countries that employ the JDH method in parliamentary elections. Moreover, we discuss the applications of the formula for modeling the effects of vote swings, coalition formation and breakup, spoiler effects, electoral engineering, artificial thresholds and political gerrymandering. By not requiring district-level vote shares, our formula simplifies electoral simulations using the JDH method. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Szacowanie prawdopodobieństwa; Analiza nierównomierności rozkładów; Wybory parlamentarne

EN

Probability estimation; Unequal distribution analysis; Parliamentary election

• Czasopismo: Decyzje
• Rocznik: 2019
• Numer: nr 32
• Strony: 5--40

Twórcy

autor

Jarosław Flis

• Uniwersytet Jagielloński

autor

Wojciech Słomczyński

• Uniwersytet Jagielloński

autor

Dariusz Stolicki

• Uniwersytet Jagielloński

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.129