PL EN


Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników
2020 | 5 | nr 2 | 119--142
Tytuł artykułu

Analysis of Tax Compliance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Firm-Level Study

Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
This study analyses tax compliance among firms in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) within an extended Slippery Slope Framework (eSSF). It applies instrumental variables and generalized estimating equations models on a constructed World Bank's Enterprise Survey longitudinal dataset. The re- sults indicate that the perceived power of the tax authorities does not inuence firms' tax compliance, which could be linked to corruption in the form of informal payment. The results also show that corruption encour- ages the culture of tax non-compliance among firms in SSA because the de- faulting firms bribe tax authorities in order to avoid paying taxes and being punished for that. In addition, the results demonstrate that the per- ceived trust of tax authorities (state representatives) is vitally important in encouraging tax compliance among firms in SSA. In terms of political deci- sions, it may be implied that gaining trust of taxpayers should be pursued.(original abstract)
Słowa kluczowe
Rocznik
Tom
5
Numer
Strony
119--142
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
  • Ankara Yldirim Beyazit University, Turkey
autor
  • Gombe State University, Nigeria
  • Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria
Bibliografia
  • Alabede, J. O., Arin, Z. Z., Idris, K. M. (2011). Determinants of tax compliance behaviour: A proposed model for Nigeria." International Research Journal of Finance and Economics", 78(1):121{136.
  • Allingham, M. G. Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. "Journal of Public Economics", 1(3{4):323{338.
  • Alm, J. (2018). What Motivates Tax Compliance? "Journal of Economic Surveys", 33(2):353{388.
  • Alm, J., Blackwell, C., McKee, M. (2004). Audit Selection and Firm Compliance with a Broad-based Sales Tax. "National Tax Journal", 57(2):209{227.
  • Alm, J., Martinez-Vazquez, J., and McClellan, C. (2016). Corruption and Firm Tax Evasion. "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization", 124(C):146{163.
  • Almunia, M. and Lopez-Rodriguez, D. (2018). Under the Radar: The E_ects of Mon- itoring Firms on Tax Compliance. "American Economic Journal: Economic Policy", 10(1):1{38.
  • Alon, A. Hageman, A. M. (2013). The Impact of Corruption on Firm Tax Com- pliance in Transition Economies: Whom Do You Trust?" Journal of Business Ethics", 116(3):479{494.
  • Amoh, J. K. Ali-Nakyea, A. (2019). Does corruption cause tax evasion? Evidence from an emerging economy. "Journal of Money Laundering Control", 22(2):217{232.
  • Antinyan, A., Corazzini, L., and Pavesi, F. (2020). Does trust in the government matter for whistleblowing on tax evaders? Survey and experimental evidence." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization," 171:77{95.
  • Ayuba, A., Saad, N., Ari_n, Z. Z. (2018). Testing the Assumptions of Slippery Slope Framework on Tax Compliance: Evidence from Nigerian SMEs. "DLSU Business & Economics Review", 27(2):166{178.
  • Babatunde, O. A., Ibukun, A. O., Oyeyemi, O. G. (2017). Taxation revenue and economic growth in Africa. "Journal of Accounting and Taxation", 9(2):11{22.
  • Baum, A. Gupta, S. (2017). Corruption, Taxes and Compliance. IMF Working Papers, 15(2):190{216.
  • Bertinelli, L., Bourgain, A., L_eon, F. (2020). Corruption and tax compliance: evidence from small retailers in Bamako, Mali. "Applied Economics Letters", 27(5):366{370.
  • Cai, H. Liu, Q. (2009). Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms. "The Economic Journal", 119(537):764{795.
  • Cameron, A. C. Trivedi, P. K. (2005). Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Cobham, A. Jansk_y, P. (2017). Global distribution of revenue loss from tax avoidance:Re-estimation and country results. Working Paper 2017/55, United Nations University World Institute for Development Economic Research WIDER.
  • Crivelli, E., de Mooij, R., Keen, M. (2016). Base Erosion, Pro_t Shifting and Devel- oping Countries." FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis", 72(3):268{301.
  • Damayanti, T. and Martono, S. (2018). Taxpayer Compliance, Trust, and Power. "Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan", 22(2):231{239.
  • Djankov, S., Ganser, T., McLiesh, C., Ramalho, R., Shleifer, A. (2010). The E_ect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship. "American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics", 2(3):31{64.
  • Engida, T. G. Baisa, G. A. (2014). Factors Inuencing taxpayers' compliance with the tax system: An empirical study in Mekelle City, Ethiopia. "eJournal of Tax Research", 12:433{452.
  • Federal Inland Revenue Service (2018). Tax Statistics/Reports: Annual Summary of Collection from Year 2000. 11 September 2018. https://www.firs.gov.ng/ tax-statistics.html.
  • Gangl, K., Hofmann, E., Hartl, B., Berkics, M. (2020). The impact of powerful authorities and trustful taxpayers: evidence for the extended slippery slope framework from Austria, "Finland, and Hungary. Policy Studies", 41(1):98{111.
  • Gangl, K., Torgler, B., Kirchler, E., and Hofmann, E. (2014). E_ects of supervision on tax compliance: Evidence from a _eld experiment in Austria." Economics Letters", 123(3):378{382.
  • Gauthier, B. Reinikka, R. (2006). Shifting Tax Burdens through Exemptions and Eva- sion - An Empirical Investigation of Uganda. "Journal of African Economies", 15(3):373{ 398.
  • Gberegbe, F. B. Umoren, A. O. (2017). The Perception of Tax Fairness and Personal Income Tax Compliance of Smes in Rivers State. "Journal of Research in Business and Management", 5(2):40{51.
  • Hibbs, D. A. and Piculescu, V. (2010). Tax Toleration and Tax Compliance: How Gov- ernment A_ects the Propensity of Firms to Enter the Uno_cial Economy. "American Journal of Political Science", 54(1):18{33.
  • Jahnke, B. Weisser, R. A. (2019). How does petty corruption a_ect tax morale in Sub-Saharan Africa?" European Journal of Political Economy", 60:101751.
  • Joulfaian, D. (2009). Bribes and Business Tax Evasion. "The European Journal of Comparative Economics", 6(2):227{244.
  • Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. "Econometrica", 47(2):263{291.
  • Kamasa, K., Adu, G., Oteng-Abayie, E. F. (2019). Tax Compliance in Sub-Saharan Africa: How Important are Non-Pecuniary Factors?" African Journal of Economic Review", 7(1):154{175.
  • Kastlunger, B., Lozza, E., Kirchler, E., Schabmann, A. (2013). Powerful authorities and trusting citizens: The Slippery Slope Framework and tax compliance in Italy. "Journal of Economic Psychology", 34(c):36{45.
  • Kirchler, E., Hoelzl, E., Wahl, I. (2008). Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The \slippery slope" framework." Journal of Economic Psychology", 29(2):210{225.
  • Kirchler, E., Kogler, C., and Muehlbacher, S. (2014). Cooperative Tax Compliance: From Deterrence to Deference. "Current Directions in Psychological Science", 23(2):87{92.
  • Kirchler, E., Muehlbacher, S., Hoelzl, E., Webley, P. (2009). E_ort and Aspirations in Tax Evasion: Experimental Evidence. "Applied Psychology: An International Review", 58(3):488{507.
  • Kirchler, E. Wahl, I. (2010). Tax compliance inventory TAX-I: Designing an inventory for surveys of tax compliance. "Journal of Economic Psychology", 31(3):331{346.
  • Kleven, H. J., Kreiner, C. T., Saez, E. (2016). Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries. "Economica", 83(330):219{ 246.
  • Lee, Y. and Gordon, R. H. (2005). Tax structure and economic growth. "Journal of Public Economics", 89(5{6):1027{1043.
  • Lisi, G. (2014). The interaction between trust and power: Effects on tax compliance and macroeconomic implications." Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics", 53(C):24{33.
  • Lisi, G. (2019). Slippery slope framework, tax morale and tax compliance: a theoretical integration and an empirical assessment. Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour, 2:19.
  • Mardhiah, M., Miranti, R., Tanton, R. (2019). The Slippery Slope Framework: Extending the Analysis by Investigating Factors A_ecting Trust and Power. CESifo Working Paper Series 7494, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Martinez-Vazquez, J. and Sanz-Arcega, E. (2020). Can Pre-Populated Tax Returns Enhance Tax Compliance? The Effects of the Spanish Renta Web Initiative from a Sociology of Taxation Perspective. International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper2009, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  • McCullagh, P. Nelder, J. A. (1989). Generalized Linear Models. London: Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2 edition.
  • Mendoza, E. G., Razin, A., Tesar, L. L. (1994). E_ective Tax Rates in Macroeconomics: Cross-Country Estimates of Tax Rates on Factor Incomes and Consumption. "Journal of Monetary Economics", 34(3):297{323.
  • Muller, A. Kolk, A. (2015). Responsible Tax as Corporate Social Responsibility: The Case of Multinational Enterprises and Effective Tax in India. "Business & Society", 54(4):435{463.
  • Murphy, R. (2019). Tax and modern monetary theory. "Real-World Economics Review", 89(89):138{147.
  • Naibei, K. Siringi, E. (2011). Impact of Electronic Tax Registers on VAT Compliance: A Study of Private Business Firms. "African Research Review", 5(1):73{88.
  • Nur-Tegin, K. D. (2008). Determinants of Business Tax Compliance. The B.E. "Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy", 8(1):1{28.
  • Payne, J. E. a Saunoris, J. W. (2020). Corruption and Firm Tax Evasion in Transition Economies: Results from Censored Quantile Instrumental Variables Estimation. "Atlantic Economic Journal", 48(2):195{206.
  • Richter, B. K., Samphantharak, K., and Timmons, J. F. (2009). Lobbying and Taxes. "American Journal of Political Science", 53(4):893{909.
  • Rosid, A., Evans, C., and Tran-Nam, B. (2017). Perceptions of Corruption and Tax Non-Compliance Behaviour: Policy Implications for Developing Countries. "Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies", 54(1):25{60.
  • Rosid, A., Evans, C., Tran-Nam, B. (2019). Perceptions of Corruption and TaxNon-Compliance Behaviour: Policy Implications for Developing Countries. Available at SSRN 3317994.
  • Sapiei, N. S., Kasipillai, J., Eze, U. C. (2014). Determinants of tax compliance behaviour of corporate taxpayers in Malaysia. "eJournal of Tax Research", 12(2):383{ 409.
  • Slemrod, J. (2007). Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion. "Journal of Economic Perspectives", 21(1):25{48.
  • Srinivasan, T. N. (1973). Tax evasion: A model. "Journal of Public Economics", 2(4):339{ 346.
  • Studenmund, A. H. (2014). Using Econometrics: A Practical Guide. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 6 edition.
  • Ufere, N., Gaskin, J., Perelli, S., Somers, A., Boland Jr, R. (2020). Why is bribery pervasive among _rms in sub-Saharan African countries? Multi-industry empirical evidence of organizational isomorphism. "Journal of Business Research", 108:92{104.
  • Varotsis, N. and Katerelos, I. (2020). Tax behaviour relating to the review of a revised regional tax policy: a study in Greece." Journal of Economic Structures", 9(7):1{16.
  • World Bank (2018a). Business Enterprise Surveys. Washington DC: The World Bank Group. https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.
  • World Bank (2018b). World Development Indicators. Washington DC: The World Bank Group.
  • Yee, C. P., Moorthy, K., and Soon, W. C. K. (2017). Taxpayers' perceptions on tax evasion behaviour: an empirical study in Malaysia." International Journal of Law and Management", 59(3):413{429.
  • Yitzhaki, S. (1974). A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis. Journal of Public "Economics", 3(2):201{202.
  • Zambrano, G. J. (2005). Modi_ed maximum likelihood estimation of tobit models with _xed e_ects: Theory and an application to earnings equations." Investigaciones Economicas", 29(3):575{607.
  • Zeng, K., Li, S., and Li, Q. (2013). The Impact of Economic Growth and Tax Reform on Tax Revenue and Structure: Evidence from China Experience. "Modern Economy",4(12):839{851.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171606897

Zgłoszenie zostało wysłane

Zgłoszenie zostało wysłane

Musisz być zalogowany aby pisać komentarze.
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.