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1
Content available remote The Status of Conditional Syllogism in Syllogistics
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The form of the conditional syllogism resembles thatof the categoricalsyllogism, while its subject matter is at least a conditional premise, but itsconclusion is always conditional conjunctive or disjunctive. This mixedstructure to which we apply the rules of the categorical syllogism, is a structure of which Aristotle did not have an idea, and which the Stoics did not conceive, and which the non-Arabian logicians did not know until in modern times. But what we have to notice here is the putting of a conditional matter in the form of the categorical syllogism, and it is this kind of hybridization, if we dare to say, which generated this mixed structure which appeared for the first time in thehistory of logic in the treatise on the logic of Ibn Sina and which can beconsidered a discovery by this author until proof to the contrary, and that the ancient Arabian logicians have taken the habit of exhibiting in their treatises.(original abstract)
In this paper, we are trying to summarize the peak of achievement of the Arabian logicians of the fifteenth century by making a classification and sketching in familiar terms the conditional and subjunctive syllogisms in Muḥammad Ibn Yusūf al-SSinūsī's (1426-1490) work, i.e. in his explanation of Kitāb al-Muḫtaşar fī al-Manṭiq of al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn ʿArafa (1316- 1401). (original abstract)
The authors investigate the properties of first-order logic having its semantics based on a generalized (partial) approximation of sets. The goal of the investigation in this article is to compare the classical first-order semantics with a partial and lower approximation-based one. The idea is that lower approximation represents the reliable knowledge, so the reasoning used by the lower approximation may be valid or may be valid with some limitations. First, the authors show an experimental result which confute the previous supposition and the result of an algorithm which generates refutations for some well-known valid arguments: the 12 syllogisms of Aristotle. We think that these syllogisms represent the most common usage of categorical statements. A language with single-level quantification is constructed, as syllogisms can be formalized using this language. Based on the experimental results, the authors suggest some modifications of the semantics if the goal is to approximate the classical case.(original abstract)
In this paper, I analyze the shift in Twardowski's views between his early psychologistic theory of logic and his later anti-psychologistic theory. In particular, I point out that the interpretation suggesting that this change merely involves Twardowski enriching his ontology with products encounters a certain problem in light of his earlier views. To present this problem more precisely, I discuss the foundations of Twardowski's theory of products, focusing on aspects relevant to the issue of psychologism. Based on this, I reconstruct Twardowski's theory of logic and highlight where he identified the fallacy of psychologism. I contrast this reconstructed theory with Twardowski's earlier views at key points and demonstrate that the difference between his early psychologistic theory and his later anti-psychologistic theory is a matter of a shift in emphasis rather than a significant change in the theoretical system itself, and that Twardowski himself understood (original abstract)
The paper discusses the well-known logic paradox formulated by Grelling. It belongs to the class of paradoxes known as Russell's paradoxes. Analysing Grelling‟s paradox, the author arrives at the conclusion showing its apparent nature, in other words resolving the problem.(original abstract)
Człowiek z natury dąży do uporządkowania swych relacji ze światem oraz własnego doświadczenia. Równowaga poznawcza oznacza zarazem przewidywalność i racjonalność własnych przekonań i zachowań. Tworzymy w taki sposób na własny użytek wizję świata, w którym żyjemy. Konsekwencją tego jest naturalna skłonność przypisywania wizjom świata innych ludzi podobnego uporządkowania jak własnej. Generalizacja taka wynika jednak nie z bezpośredniego doświadczenia, ale z bieżących potrzeb związanych ze sprawnym funkcjonowaniem w świecie. Można zastanawiać się nad granicami owej generalizacji, ale wydaje się, że innym przypisujemy co najwyżej tyle walorów, ile dostrzegamy w sobie. Stąd z krytycznej oceny siebie wynika przekonanie o moralności innych. (fragment tekstu)
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Content available remote On Logics of Transitive Verbs With and Without Intersective Adjectives
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The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the natural logic program which invents logics in natural language. This study presents two logics: a logical system called R(s,,) containing transitive verbs and a more expressive logical system R(),,,IA) containing both transitive verbs and intersective adjectives. The paper offers three different set-theoretic semantics which are equivalent for the logics. (original abstract)
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Content available remote Continuous-Logical Methods in Mathematical Economics
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An application of continuous logic for the mathematical description of economical systems is given. Parallel, sequential, parallel-sequential and sequential-parallel systems are calculated using continuous logic (CL) methods. (original abstract)
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Content available remote Assertions and Conditionals : a Historical and Pragmatic Stance
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The assertion candidate expresses a potential logical-linguistic object that can be asserted. It differs from both the act and the product of assertion; it needs not to be actually asserted and differs from the assertion made. We investigate the medieval origins of this notion, which are almost neglected in contemporary logic. Our historical analysis suggests an interpretation of the assertion candidate within the system of logic for pragmatics.(original abstract)
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Content available remote Preface : Conditional : Conceptual and Historical Analysis
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The logic of conditional is developed hereby in a series of papers, contributing to a historical and critical analysis of what the logical constant is expected to mean. (original abstract)
Jednym z podstawowych przedmiotów badania polskiej teorii i filozofii prawa stały się zagadnienia lingwistyczne, w myśli założeń metodologicznych filozofii analitycznej, dla której głównym przedmiotem ref1eksji jest język. Wśród tych zagadnień znajdują się sporne zagadnienia z obszaru lingwistyki i logiki, które nazywa się często semiotycznymi (semiotyka logiczna), a w szczególności kwestia wartości logicznej normy prawnej i zagadnienie logiki norm. Problematyka związana z tym zagadnieniem co jakiś czas powraca do literatury, gdyż mimo wielu prób ostatecznego rozstrzygnięcia pytania o wartość logiczną normy prawnej, pojawia się krytyka zastanych rozwiązań i nowe wątpliwości ujawnione w jej ramach. (fragment tekstu)
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Content available remote Existence and Predication in Free Logics
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This paper presents a fundamental difference between negative semantics for free logics and positive ones regarding the logical relations between existence and predication. We conclude that this difference is the key to understand why negative free logics are stronger, i.e., they prove more, than positive free logics.(original abstract)
13
Content available remote Number Three as a Law of Science. In Praise of Number Three
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Comprehension of nature, in the simplest and quickest fashion, boils down to the differentiation of three states. This is probably related to the psychological fact that the human mind grasps only natural numbers from zero to three and the other numbers it calculates. We live in a divalent world created by Aristotle. However not everything can be reduced to two categories: "yes" and "no", because Nature is abundant. The principle of continuity which facilitates understanding is in natural conflict with the binary description of the world. Ever since the times of Aristotle it has been normal to use in science a description of the world that is reduced to two states: "true" and "false". In nature it is more obvious to distinguish three states: low-medium-high or negative-neutral-positive, etc. Man embraces at a single glance sets of three elements at most, and more numerous sets are divided into parts. Binary logic may have a negative impact on the process of teaching and examinations, especially if the tests are used.(original abstract)
Some interesting cases of non-monotonic reasoning have already been identified in medieval theological texts. Jacob Archambault proved in 2015 that the argumentation presented by St Anselm of Canterbury in his Proslogion has non-monotonic "embeddings". My own contribution from 2011 indicated that we can argue that a non-monotonic logic underlies some discussions provided by St Thomas Aquinas in his Summa theologiae, and showed that Boethius of Dacia used non-monotonic reasoning in his De aeternitate mundi. In this article, I would like to briefly present these examples and verify whether we can speak about similar cases in medieval Biblical exegesis. My aim is to outline particular problems connected with the identification of non-monotonicity which are specific to theology, as well as assumptions that should be adopted to successfully discuss this issue.(original abstract)
Celem tego artykułu jest zachęcenie czytelnika do zapoznawania się z ideami przedstawionymi w opublikowanej ponad 100 lat temu książce Zygmunta Herynga pt. Logika ekonomii. Zasadnicze pojęcia ekonomiczne ze stanowiska nauki o energii. Przedstawiono te myśli Herynga, które, jak się wydaje, nie straciły na aktualności. Ze względu na ograniczone rozmiary artykułu nie dokonano analizy porównawczej myśli Herynga ze współczesnymi trendami analizy ekonomicznej.(abstrakt oryginalny)
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Content available remote A Unifying Field in Logics - Book Review
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Paradoxism is an avant-garde movement in literature, art, philosophy, science, based on excessive use of antitheses, antinomies, contradictions, parables, odds, paradoxes in creations. It was set up and led by the writer Florentin Smarandache since 1980's, who said: "The goal is to enlargement of the artistic sphere through non-artistic elements. But especially the counter-time, counter-sense creation. Also, to experiment." Paradoxism = paradox + ism, means the theory and school of using paradoxes in literary, artistic, philosophical, scientific creations. "Paradoxism started as an anti-totalitarian protest against a closed society, Romania of 1980's, where the whole culture was manipulated by a small group. Only their ideas and their publications counted. We couldn't publish almost anything. Later, I based it on contradictions. Why? Because we lived in that society a double life: an official one - propagated by the political system, and another one real. In mass-media it was promulgated that 'our life is wonderful', but in reality 'our life was miserable'. The paradox flourishing!" (Florentin Smarandache). The new theory generalizes the fuzzy logic and introduces also two new concepts: "neutrosophy", the study of neutralities as an extension of dialectics and its derivative "neutrosophic", such as "neutrosophic logic", neutrosophic set", "neutrosophic probability", and "neutrosophic statistics" opening in this manner ways of research in four fields: philosophy, logics, set theory and probability/statistics. According to this new theory is also available Albers Einstein's statement: "Not everything that can be controled counts and not everything that counts can be counted ".(original abstract)
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Content available remote The Logic of Self-Organized Criticality
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A consideration of non-classical logic in terms of classical one allows us to show a role of designated truth values. In this way we show that our version of non-classical many-valued logic can be based on the structure of genetic code.(original abstract)
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Content available remote The Reverse Logic of Resolving the Contradictions
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Contradictions have not only a negative role as a limiter of logical reasoning, they are a necessary element of the cognitive process at paradigmatic and philosophical levels. Reverse logic offers the mechanism of correct including of contradictory proposals in the structure of reasoning at these levels. At the base of the reverse logic lies the principle of demarcation between the procedure of obtaining the new propositions and the mechanism of transferring truth between propositions.(original abstract)
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Content available remote Theodore the Studite's Christology Against Its Logical Background
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Theodore the Studite resolved the logical problem posed by the second Iconoclasm in an explicitly paraconsistent way, when he applied to Jesus the definition of the human hypostasis while stating that there is no human hypostasis in Jesus. Methodologically he was following, albeit without knowing, Eulogius of Alexandria. He, in turn, was apparently followed by Photius, but in a confused manner. (original abstract)
According to the Navya Naiyāyikas, inference is the knowledge, which is produced out of consideration. But what is to be understood by the term 'consideration' or 'parāmarśa'? According to them, parāmarśa or consideration is the factor through the operation of which the inferential conclusion can be attained. Parāmarśa has been defined as the knowledge of the existence of the hetu or reason in the pakṣa or subject, which reason is characterized by its being concomitant with the sādhya, the knowledge in the form of parāmarśa is actually caused by the knowledge of invariable concomitance of probans (hetu) with the probandum (sādhya) and the knowledge of the existence of the hetu in the subject (pakṣa). It has been said by Viśvanātha that the cognition of the existence of probans or hetu in the subject of inference along with the cognition of the prabans or hetu as pervaded by sādhya is called parāmarśa (pakṣasya vyāpyavṛttitvadhīḥ parāmarśa ucyate). The invariable co-existence in the form 'where there is smoke, there is fire' is known as vyāpti or invariable concomitance. Here the invariable co-existence (avyabhicārī sāhacarya) between the probans and probandum (i.e., smoke and fire) is the definition of vyāpti. The term 'co-existence' means remaining in the same locus of the probans with the probandum, which is not the counter positive of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the hetu. To Gangeśa, the knowledge of the co-existence of the probans and probandum along with the absence of the knowledge of deviation of the probans is the cause of ascertaining vyāpti. Repeated observations, of course, sometimes act as a promoter (prayojaka) in ascertaining vyāpti by removing the doubt of deviation. The doubt of deviation can be removed sometimes by Tarka or sometimes by the absence of the collocation of causes of doubt, which is called svataḥsiddhaḥ. Gangeśa admits sāmānyalakṣaṇā as a pratyāsatti in ascertaining vyāpti between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general. To him, the super-normal connection through universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti) has got a prominent role in ascertaining vyāpti. If somebody challenges about the validity of the syllogistic argument in the form "The mountain is fiery as it possesses smoke" (parvato vahnimān dhūmāt), the philosophers of Nyāya and Navya-nyāya persuasion will justify the same with the help of five constituents (avayava-s). The process is called parāthānumāna (syllogistic argument for making others understand). The constituents of a syllogism are proposition (pratijňā), reason (hetu), example (udāharaṇa), application (upanaya), and conclusion (nigamana).(original abstract)
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