Ramy instytucjonalne polityki pieniężnej - teoria i pomiar

• Autorzy: Jacek Pietrucha

Warianty tytułu

The Institutional Framework of the Monetary Policy - the Theory and the Measurement

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Przedstawiono rozwiązania instytucjonalne określające niezależność, przejrzystość oraz odpowiedzialność polityki pieniężnej prowadzonej przez bank centralny. Omówiono ramy instytucjonalne polityki pieniężnej jako problemu wyboru właściwego rozwiązania instytucjonalnego. Zdefiniowano zależności, przejrzystości oraz odpowiedzialności na tle najważniejszych nurtów dyskusji w literaturze przedmiotu. Podjęto próbę uporządkowania dyskusji nad związkami miedzy ramami instytucjonalnymi polityki pieniężnej a cechami instytucjonalnymi systemu gospodarczego i systemu politycznego oraz zaproponowano uwzględnienie nowych aspektów. Na koniec zebrano wyniki dotychczasowych badań empirycznych.

EN

The institutional solutions determining the independence, transparency and responsibility of the monetary policy carried out by the central bank were presented. Institutional framework of the monetary policy as the problem of choice of the appropriate institutional solution was discussed. The relations, the transparency and the responsibilities relating to the most important threads of discussion in the subject literature were defined. An attempt at clearing up discussion on relations of the monetary policy institutional framework and the institutional features of the economic system, as well as the political system were presented; also taking new aspects into consideration was additionally suggested. At the end, the results of current empirical researches were collected. (AT)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Polityka pieniężna; Banki centralne; Wiarygodność instytucji finansowych; Kraje rozwijające się; Badania naukowe

EN

Monetary policy; Central banks; Reliability of financial institutions; Developing countries; Scientific research

• Czasopismo: Prace Naukowe / Akademia Ekonomiczna w Katowicach
• Rocznik: 2008
• Strony: 311

Twórcy

autor

Jacek Pietrucha

Bibliografia

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• Akty prawne
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• Federal Reserve Act, 1913.
• General Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
• Law adopted at the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 20 June 1997.
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• Law No. 101 of 26 May 1998 on the Statute of the National Bank of Romania.
• Law of the Azerbaijan Republic about the National Bank of the Azerbaijan Republic, 1996.
• Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on the National Bank of Kyrgyz Republic, 1997.
• Law of Ukraine on the National Bank of Ukraine, 1999.
• Law on the Bank of Latva adopted on May 19, 1992.
• Law on the Bulgarian National Bank issued by the 38th National Assembly, 1997.
• Law on the Croatian National Bank, 2001.
• Law on the National Bank of Macedonia, 2000.
• Law on the National Bank of Moldova, 1995.
• Law on the National Bank of Serbia, 2003.
• Letter to the Governor from the Chancellor, 2003.
• Organic Law of Georga on the National Bank of Georga, 2001.
• Policy Targets Agreement, December 2002.
• Republic of Albania Law on the Bank of Albania, 1997.
• Republic of Armenia Law on the Central bank of the Republic of Armenia, 1996.
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• Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act, 1989.
• Russian Federation Federal Law on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 2002.
• Statute of the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus, Approved by Edict