"Board Independence" and Compensation Structure of Directors

• Autorzy: Elena Merino , Montserrat Manzaneque , Alba Maria Priego

Warianty tytułu

"Niezależność zarządu" a struktura wynagrodzeń dyrektorów

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This paper examines the relationship between board independence and the level and structure of directors´ compensation to determine whether this "independence" exerts a moderating effect on the different systems of remuneration granted to directors. We have developed several models based on linear panel data regression. The sample included 76 listed companies on the Spanish Continuous Market for the period 2004-2009. The results reveal that the moderating effect of board independence on directors´ compensation depends on the type of remuneration, being especially significant in the case of variable remuneration but not for fixed remuneration. This is significant for the study context because the fixed remuneration is the most important retribution concept. The results of this paper reveals that the inefficient of the board as mechanisms of control on fixed remuneration could be translated into an insufficient control of wealth extraction from the shareholders by the management. Our results contribute to the existing debate on the appropriate norms of corporate governance control over the directors' compensation. These results offer additional evidence about the impact of board independence over the structure of compensation granted to directors, issue shortly studied so far. (original abstract)

Celem artykułu jest zbadanie relacji między "niezależnością zarządu" a poziomem i strukturą wynagrodzeń dyrektorów i ustalenie, czy ta "niezależność" wpływa na poszczególne systemy wynagrodzeń dyrektorów. W badaniu zostały wykorzystane modele oparte na regresji liniowej dla danych panelowych. Próba obejmuje 76 spółek notowanych na Hiszpańskim Rynku Notowań Ciągłych w latach 2004-2009. Wyniki wskazują, że wpływ stopnia "niezależności zarządu" na wynagrodzenie dyrektorów zależy od rodzaju wynagrodzenia i jest szczególnie ważne w przypadku zmiennego wynagrodzenia, ale nie dla stałego wynagrodzenia. Jest to istotne w kontekście przeprowadzonego badania, ponieważ stałe wynagrodzenie jest najważniejszym elementem w sposobach wynagradzania. Wyniki badań wskazują, że nieefektywność zarządu jako mechanizmu kontroli stałych wynagrodzeń może oznaczać niewystarczającą kontrolę nad tworzeniem bogactwa dla akcjonariuszy. Wyniki badań stanowią wkład do toczącej się debaty dotyczącej właściwych norm ładu korporacyjnego nad wynagrodzeniami dyrektorów. Wyniki dowodzą wpływu "niezależności zarządu" na strukturę wynagrodzeń dyrektorów, co szerzej do tej pory nie było badane. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Corporate governance; Board of directors; Wage structure; Remuneration

PL

Ład korporacyjny; Zarząd; Struktura płac; Wynagrodzenia

• Czasopismo: Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting
• Rocznik: 2013
• Tom: 2
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 125--152

Twórcy

autor

Elena Merino

• University of Castilla-La Mancha, Spain

autor

Montserrat Manzaneque

• University of Castilla-La Mancha, Spain

autor

Alba Maria Priego

• University of Castilla-La Mancha, Spain

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.12775/CJFA.2013.020