Are We Done with Preference Rankings? If We Are, Then What?

• Autorzy: Hannu Nurmi
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Intransitive, incomplete and discontinuous preferences are not always irrational but may be based on quite reasonable considerations. Hence, we pursue the possibility of building a theory of social choice on an alternative foundation, viz. on individual preference tournaments. Tournaments have been studied for a long time independently of rankings and a number of results are therefore just waiting to be applied in social choice. Our focus is on Slater's rule. A new interpretation of the rule is provided. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Preference theory; Social choice theory

PL

Teoria preferencji; Teoria wyboru społecznego

• Czasopismo: Operations Research and Decisions
• Rocznik: 2014
• Tom: 24
• Numer: nr 4
• Strony: 63--74

Twórcy

autor

Hannu Nurmi

• University of Turku, Finland

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5277/ord140405