Testing Parallel Pricing Behavior in the Polish Whole-sale Fuel Market : an ARDL - Bound Testing Approach

• Autorzy: Sylwester Bejger

Warianty tytułu

Test paralelnych zachowań cenowych na hurtowym rynku paliw płynnych w Polsce oparty na podejściu ARDL /bound testing

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In this study, we investigated whether the observed series of fuel prices can be compatible with a specific theoretical model of strategic player interaction. Our primary interest is in determining whether a parallel pricing policy, implied by a theoretical model of strategic interactions, can be an industry-observed pricing mechanism. Therefore, we first calculated various descriptive statistics of the price series to discover any common patterns of individual series. Next, we determined whether parallel co-movement of the price levels exist using an ARDL - bound testing approach. This study finds that if we restricted our research to the described pricing mechanism (IPP pricing based on previous day fundamentals), the players will have chosen the levels of price in a parallel mode; this excludes 2007, when LOTOS appeared to be the price leader. (original abstract)

Artykuł dotyczy badania, czy obserwowane cen paliw płynnych na rynku hurtowym mogą być zgodne z określonym modelem teoretycznym interakcji strategicznych graczy. Głównym celem badawczym było określanie, czy paralelne zachowania cenowe, implikowane równowagą teoretycznego modelu interakcji strategicznych, mogą być mechanizmem ustalania cen faktycznie obserwowanym na rynku. Aby to stwierdzić wyznaczono statystyki opisowe indywidualnych szeregów czasowych cen dla ustalenia podobieństw. Następnie zbadano współzależność ruchów cenowych graczy wykorzystując podejście ARDL /bound testing. Stwierdzono, że jeśli gracze wykorzystują mechanizm cenowy ceny parytetu importowego (przyjęty w modelu teoretycznym), ich zachowania replikują paralelne zachowanie cenowe, za wyjątkiem roku 2007, w którym LOTOS wydaje się być liderem cenowym. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Fuel market; Cointegration; Price mechanism

PL

Rynek paliw; Kointegracja; Mechanizmy cenowe

• Czasopismo: Dynamic Econometric Models
• Rocznik: 2015
• Tom: 15
• Strony: 111--128

Twórcy

autor

Sylwester Bejger

• Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.12775/DEM.2015.007