Powiązania spółek finansowych z przedsiębiorstwami sfery realnej w sieci rad dyrektorów na polskim rynku kapitałowym

• Autorzy: Dariusz Siudak

Warianty tytułu

The Relations Between Financial Companies and Real Economy Enterprises in the Network of Interlocking Directorates on the Polish Capital Market

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Celem artykułu jest analiza relacji między spółkami finansowymi a przedsiębiorstwami sfery realnej oraz porównanie ich centralnych pozycji w sieci powiązań przedsiębiorstw wspólną dyrekcją na polskim rynku kapitałowym. Dane pozyskano ze spółek notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie oraz na rynku NewConnect na koniec 2014 roku. Podstawowym wnioskiem z przeprowadzonego badania jest stwierdzenie częściej występujących powiązań przedsiębiorstw, a także ich ilości oraz zajmowanie centralnej pozycji w sieci pod względem miar centralności bliskości i społeczności przez spółki finansowe w porównaniu z przedsiębiorstwami sfery realnej.(abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The aim of the article is the analysis of relations and comparison of central position between financial companies and real economy enterprises in the network of interlocking directorates on the Polish capital market. We obtained corporate board information on the main market of the Warsaw Stock Exchange and on the NewConnect market in December 2014. It was found that, comparing to real economy enterprises, financial companies adapt interlocking strategy more frequently and with higher intensity, and also hold more central position in the network of directorates in terms of closeness and community measures.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Rynek kapitałowy; Spółki; Spółki giełdowe; Rada nadzorcza spółki; Personel kierowniczy

EN

Capital market; Companies; Stock market companies; Supervisory board of the company; Management staff

• Czasopismo: Studia Ekonomiczne / Polska Akademia Nauk. Instytut Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Rocznik: 2016
• Numer: nr 1 (88)
• Strony: 89--114

Twórcy

autor

Dariusz Siudak

• Politechnika Łódzka

Bibliografia

• Allen M. (1974), The structure of interorganizational elite cooptation: Interlocking corporate directorates, "American Sociological Review", 39(3), s. 393-406.
• Baysinger B., Butler H. (1985), Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition, "Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations", 1(1), s. 101-124.
• Bertoni F., Randone A. (2006), The Small-World of Italian Finance: Ownership Interconnections and Board Interlocks amongst Italian Listed Companies, SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.917587.
• Bonne A., Field L., Karpoff J., Raheja C. (2007), The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis, "Journal of Financial Economics", 85, s. 66-101.
• Booth R., Deli D. (1999), On executives of financial institutions as outside director, "Journal of Corporate Finance", 5, s. 227-250.
• Borgatti S., Everett M., Johnson J.C. (2013), Analyzing Social Networks, Sage, London.
• BurakGuner B., Malmendier U., Tate G. (2008), Financial expertise of directors, "Journal of Financial Economics", 88, s. 323-354.
• Byrd D., Mizruchi M. (2005), Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms, "Journal of Corporate Finance", 11, s. 129-173.
• Chhaochharia V., Grinstein Y. (2007), The changing structure of US corporate boards: 1997-2003, "Corporate Governance", 15, s. 1215-1223.
• Davis G., Mizruchi M. (1999), The money center cannot hold: commercial banks in the U.S. system of corporate governance, "Administrative Science Quarterly", 44, s. 215-239.
• Devos E., Prevost A., Puthenpurackal J. (2009), Are interlocked directors effective monitors?, "Financial Management", 38, s. 861-887.
• Dittmann I., Maug E., Schneider C. (2010), Bankers on the boards of German firms: What they do, what they are worth, and why they are (still) there, "Review of Finance", 14, s. 35-71.
• Dooley P. (1969), The interlocking directorate, "The American Economic Review", 59, s. 314-323.
• Drago C., Millo F., Ricciuti R., Santella P. (2015), Corporate governance reforms, interlocking directorship and company performance in Italy, "International Review of Law and Economics", 41, s. 38-49.
• Durisin B., Puzone F. (2009), Maturation of corporate governance research, 1993-2007: An assessment, "Corporate Governance: An International Review", 17, s. 266- 291.
• Eisenberg T., Sundgren S., Wells M. (1998), Larger boards size and decreasing firm value in small firms, "Journal of Financial Economics", 48, s. 35-54.
• Fama E., Jensen M. (1983), Separation of ownership and control, "Journal of Law & Economics", Vol. 26, Issue 2, s. 301-326.
• Ferris S., Jagannathan M. (2001), The incidence and determinants of multiple corporate directorship, "Applied Economics Letters", 8, s.31-35.
• Freeman L. (1979), Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification, "Social Networks", 1, s. 215-239.
• Galaskiewicz J., Wasserman S. (1981), A Dynamic study of change in a regional corporate network, "American Sociological Review", 46 (4), s. 475-484.
• Gilson S., Kose J., Lang L. (1990), Troubled debt restructurings: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default, "Journal of Financial Economics", 27, s. 315-354.
• Henning M., Brandes U., Pfeffer J., Mergel I. (2012), Studying Social Networks. A Guide to Empirical Research, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt.
• Hoshi T., Kashyap A., Scharfstein D. (1990), The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan, "Journal of Financial Economics", 27, s. 67-88.
• Jackson M. (2008), Social and Economic Networks, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
• Jensen M., Meckling W. (1976), Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, "Journal of Financial Economics", 3, s. 305-360.
• Kaczmarek S., Kimino S., Pye A. (2014), Interlocking directorship and firm performance in highly regulated sectors: the moderating impact of board diversity, "Journal of Management & Governance", 18, s. 347-372.
• Kilduff M., Tsai W. (2012), Social Networks and Organizations, Sage Publications.
• Knoke D., Yang S. (2008), Social Network Analysis, Sage Publications.
• Kolaczyk E. (2009), Statistical Analysis of Network Data. Methods and Models, Springer.
• Koput K. (2010), Social Capital. An Introduction to Managing Networks, Edward Elgar Publishing, Massachusetts.
• Kor Y., Sundaramurthy C. (2009), Experience-based human capital and social capital of outside directors, "Journal of Management", 35, s. 981-1006.
• Kotz D. (1978), Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United States, University of California Press, Berkeley.
• Kroszner R, Strahan P. (2001), Bankers on boards: Monitoring, confl icts of interest, and lender liability, "Journal of Financial Economics", 62, s. 415-452.
• Kroszner R., Strahan P. (1999), What drives deregulation? Economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions, "Quarterly Journal of Economics", 11, s. 1437-1467.
• Kumar N., Singh J. (2013), Effect of board size and promoter ownership on firm value: some empirical findings from India, "Corporate Governance", 13, s. 88-98.
• Lang J., Lockhart D. (1990), Increased environmental uncertainty and changes in board linkage patterns, "Academy of Management Journal", 33, s. 129-128.
• Lehnn K., Patro S., Zaho M. (2008), Determinants of the Size and Structure of Corporate Boards: 1935-2000, Working Paper Series, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research Hitotsubashi University.
• Levine J. (1972), The sphere of infl uence, "American Sociological Review", 37, s. 14-27.
• Linck J., Netter J., Yang T. (2008), The determinants of board structure, "Journal of Financial Economics", 87, s. 308-328.
• Loderer C., Peyer U. (2002), Board overlap, seat accumulation and share prices, "European Financial Management", 8, s. 165-192.
• Mariolis P, Jones M. (1982), Centrality in corporate interlock networks: Reliability and stability, "Administrative Science Quarterly", 27, s. 571-585.
• Mariolis P. (1975), Interlocking directorates and control of corporations: The Theory of bank control, "Social Science Quarterly", 56, s. 425-439.
• Mintz B., Schwartz M. (1981), The structure of intercorporate unity in American business, "Social Problems", 29, s. 87-103.
• Mintz B., Schwartz M. (1985), The Power Structure of American Business, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
• Mizruchi M. S., Mariolis P., Schwartz M., Mintz B. (1986), Techniques for disaggregating centrality scores in social networks, "Sociological Methodology", 16, s. 26-48.
• Mizruchi M., Stearns L. (1988), A longitudinal study of the formation of interlocking directorates, "Administrative Science Quarterly", 33, s. 194-210.
• Mizruchi M., Stearns L. (1994), A longitudinal study of borrowing by large American corporations, "Administrative Science Quarterly", 39, s. 118-140.
• Mizruchi M. (1982), The American Corporate Network: 1904-1974, Sage, Beverly Hills.
• Monem R.(2013), Determinants of board structure: Evidence from Australia, "Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics", 9, s. 33-49.
• Newman M. (2006), Finding Community Structure in Networks Using the Eigenvectors of Matrices, Physical Review E, 74 (3), s. 036104.
• Newman M. (2010), Networks. An Introduction, Oxford University Press.
• O'Hagan S. (2015), Are American interlocking directorates associated with brain circulation and do they translate into higher corporate performance?, "Geographical Review", 105, s. 344-359.
• O'Sullivan N. (2000), Managers as monitors: An analysis of the non-executive role of senior executives introduction in UK companies, "British Journal of Management", 11, s. 17-29.
• Ong C-H, Wan D., Ong K-S. (2003), An exploratory study on interlocking directorates in listed firms in Singapore, "Corporate Governance: An International Review", 11, s. 322-334.
• Pennings J.M. (1980), Interlocking Directorates, Jossey-Bass Limited,San Francisco.
• Pfeffer J. (1972), Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its environment, "Administrative Science Quarterly", 17, s. 218-228.
• Pfeffer J. (1987), A resource dependence perspective on intercorporate relations, wIntercorporate Relations: The Structural Analysis of Business, M.S. Mizruchi, M. Schwartz (red.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• Pfeffer J., Salancik G. (2003/1978), The External Control of Organizations: A Resources Dependence Perspective, Standford University Press,Standford.
• Prell C. (2012), Social Network Analysis. History, theory & Methodology, Sage Publications.
• Ramirez C. (1995), Did J.P. Morgan's men add liquidity? Corporate investment, cash fl ow, and financial structure at the turn of the twentieth century, "Journal of Finance", 50, s. 661-678.
• Ratcliff R. (1980), Banks and corporate lending: An analysis of the impact of the internal structure of the capitalist class on the lending behavior of banks, "American Sociological Review", 45, s. 553-570.
• Richardson R. (1987), Directorship interlocks and corporate profitability, "Administrative Science Quarterly", 32, s. 367-386.
• Rinaldi A., Vasta M.(2002), The Structure of Italian Capitalism, 1952-1972: New Evidence Using the Interlocking Directorates Technique, Companies, Owners, Employees, Helsinki.
• Roy M., Fox M., Hamilton R. (1994), Board size and potential corporate and director interlocks in Australasia 1984-1993, "Australian Journal of Management", 19, s. 201-217.
• Sanches L. P-C., Barroso-Castro C. (2015), It is useful to consider the interlocks according to the type of board member (executive or non-executive) who possesses them? Their effect on firm performance, "RevistaEuropea de Direccion y Economia de la Empresa", 24, s. 130-137.
• Sankowska A., Siudak D. (2015a), Empiryczna weryfikacja teorii uzależnienia zasobowego w kontekście usieciowienia rady dyrektorów (interlocking directorates), "Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego", nr 855, "Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia" nr 74, t.1, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, Szczecin, s. 661-673..
• Sankowska A., Siudak D. (2015b), Miary analizy sieciowej w ocenie strategii interlockingu - powiązania rady dyrektorów, "Nauki o Finansach", nr 1(22), s. 120-135, Wrocław.
• Santos R., Silveira A., Barros L. (2012), Board interlocking in Brazil: Directors' participation in multiple companies and its effect on firm value and profitability, "Latin American Business Review", 13, s. 1-28.
• Selznick P. (1949), TVA and the Gross Roots, Harper & Row, New York.
• Siudak D. (2015), Czy przedsiębiorstwo o wysokiej wartości współczynnika skupienia posiada niski stopień relacji w sieci powiązań wspólną dyrekcją na polskim rynku kapitałowym?, "Nauki o Finansach", nr 3, Wrocław.
• Stearns L., Mizruchi M. (1993a), Board composition and corporate financing: The impact of financial institutions representations on borrowing, "Academy of Management Journal", 36, s. 603-618.
• Stearns L., Mizruchi M. (1993b), Corporate financing: Economic and social aspects, w: Explorations in Economic Sociology, R. Swedberg (red.), Russell Sage Found, New York, s. 279-307.
• Stening B., Wan T. (1984), Interlocking directorates among Australia's largest 250 corporations, "Australia and New Zealand Journal of Sociology", 20, s. 47-55.
• Stephenson K., Zelen M. (1989), Rethinking centrality: Methods and examples, "Social Networks, 11, s. 1-37.
• Stiles P., Taylor B. (2010), Boards at Work. How Directors View Their Roles and Responsibilities, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
• Tam T. (1989), Demarcating the boundaries between self and the social: the anatomy of centrality in social networks, "Social Networks", 11, s. 387-401.
• Valente T. (2010), Social Networks and Health, Models, Methods, and Applications, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
• Wasserman S., Faust K. (1994), Social Network Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• Watts D.J., Strogatz S.H. (1998), Collective dynamics of 'small-world' networks, "Nature", 393, s. 440-442.
• Zahra S.A., Pearce II J.A. (1989), Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A Review and integrative model, "Journal of Management", 15(2), s. 291-334.
• Zang X. (1999), Research note: Personalismand corporate networks in Singapore, "Organization Studies", 20, s. 861-877.
• Zdziarski M. (2012a), Elita wewnętrznego kręgu i centralne firmy. Wyniki badań relacji przez rady nadzorcze w polskich spółkach giełdowych, "Organizacja i Kierowanie", 1(150), s. 23-39.
• Zdziarski M. (2012b), Relacje w radach nadzorczych spółek publicznych, "Współczesne Zarządzanie", nr 4, s. 223-231.