Determinants of General Government Social Spending: Evidence from the Eurozone

• Autorzy: Agata Szymańska

Warianty tytułu

Determinanty wydatków socjalnych w krajach strefy euro

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The paper analyses selected determinants of social spending in the eurozone countries. The sample includes 17 eurozone countries (euro area countries except for Malta and Slovenia) analysed over the time sample, which covers annual data between 1996 and 2017. The paper takes into account three categories of social spending: aggregated welfare spending, aggregated social protection spending, and spending on social protection benefits, and evaluates the statistical and quantitative effects of their selected determinants. The set of determinants includes general macroeconomic variables related to the condition of the economy and selected demographic factors. The analysis is based on panel data. The obtained results point out the effects of macroeconomic factors on social-type spending and the effects of old-age dependency ratio on spending, whereas the significance of the rest of the analysed demographic factors is generally ambiguous and depends on the type of spending under consideration, applied approach, specification, as well as the control variables used in the analysis. (original abstract)

W artykule poddano analizie wybrane determinanty wydatków socjalnych w krajach strefy euro. Badanie obejmuje 17 krajów strefy euro (kraje strefy euro z wyłączeniem Malty i Słowenii) analizowanych w próbie czasowej opartej na danych rocznych za lata 1996-2017. W artykule uwzględniono trzy kategorie wydatków: ujęte szeroko wydatki na cele socjalne, zagregowane wydatki na ochronę socjalną oraz wydatki na świadczenia z tytułu zabezpieczenia społecznego. Zbiór determinant uwzględnionych w badaniu obejmuje ogólne zmienne makroekonomiczne związane ze stanem aktywności gospodarczej oraz wybrane czynniki demograficzne. Analiza oparta jest na danych panelowych. Uzyskane wyniki wskazują na znaczenie czynników makroekonomicznych oraz współczynnika obciążenia demograficznego osobami starszymi, natomiast w przypadku innych analizowanych czynników demograficznych uzyskane zależności są niejednoznaczne i zależą od rodzaju rozpatrywanych wydatków, zastosowanego podejścia, specyfikacji modelu, a także zmiennych kontrolnych uwzględnionych w badaniu. (abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Eurozone; Social expenditures; Panel data; Socio-economic research; Demographic factors

PL

Strefa euro; Wydatki socjalne; Dane panelowe; Badania społeczno-ekonomiczne; Czynniki demograficzne

• Czasopismo: Ekonomista
• Rocznik: 2021
• Numer: nr 4
• Strony: 508--528

Twórcy

autor

Agata Szymańska

• University of Łódź

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.52335/dvqigjykff25