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2018 | 7(4) | 9--15
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The Knobe Effect From the Perspective of Normative Orders

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The characteristic asymmetry in the attribution of intentionality in causing side effects, known as the Knobe effect, is considered to be a stable model of human cognition. This article looks at whether the way of thinking and analysing one scenario may affect the other and whether the mutual relationship between the ways in which both scenarios are analysed may affect the stability of the Knobe effect. The theoretical analyses and empirical studies performed are based on a distinction between moral and non-moral normativity possibly affecting the judgments passed in both scenarios. Therefore, an essential role in judgments about the intentionality of causing a side effect could be played by normative competences responsible for distinguishing between normative orders. (original abstract)
Opis fizyczny
  • Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University, Poland
  • Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University, Poland
  • Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University, Poland
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