Kierunki zmian w systemie zarządzania fiskalnego strefą euro

• Autorzy: Dariusz Rosati

Warianty tytułu

Fiscal Management System of the Eurozone - Directions of Change

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Kryzys finansowy w Grecji w 2010 roku ujawnił szereg słabości w systemie zarządzania fiskalnego Unią Gospodarczo-Walutową. Przyjęte w ramach UGW mechanizmy nadzoru i kontroli nad finansami publicznymi, w tym reguły fiskalne, okazały się nieskuteczne w zapewnianiu dyscypliny fiskalnej. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie głównych słabości systemu zarządzania fiskalnego i zaproponowanie kierunków niezbędnych reform. Nieskuteczność dotychczasowej polityki wynika głównie ze słabości systemu egzekwowania przyjętych reguł fiskalnych, a to z kolei jest spowodowane brakiem dostatecznej motywacji do przestrzegania przyjętych reguł przez kraje członkowskie. Niezbędne zmiany powinny obejmować zasadnicze zwiększenie roli sankcji finansowych, w tym zapewnienie powszechności, szybkości i nieuchronności ich stosowania, wyposażenie organów UE w uprawnienia do audytu krajowej dokumentacji budżetowej, oraz zapewnienie dostosowania krajowych ram polityki fiskalnej do konieczności przestrzegania wspólnie przyjętych reguł fiskalnych. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The financial crisis in Greece in 2010 has clearly demonstrated that the system of economic governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU, including fiscal rules and mechanisms of multilateral surveillance and control, is largely inefficient and does not ensure sufficient fiscal discipline. The article discusses the main weaknesses of the existing fiscal framework of the EMU and suggests possible reforms. The failure of the economic governance in preventing large fiscal imbalances is mainly linked to weak enforcement of the existing fiscal rules, which in turn is caused by lack of appropriate incentives for member states to obey the rules. The necessary reforms should proceed in several directions. First, the role of sanctions for violating the rules should be strengthened by making the application of sanctions quick and largely automatic, and independent from political influences. Second, the EU institutions should be given larger audit and control competences, to make the system of surveillance effective. Third, national fiscal frameworks in member states should be reformed to ensure their consistency with commonly accepted EU-wide fiscal rules. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Unia Gospodarcza i Walutowa (UGW); Dług publiczny; Deficyt budżetowy; Polityka podatkowa; Reguły fiskalne

EN

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); Public debt; Budget deficit; Tax policy; Fiscal rules

• Czasopismo: Ekonomista
• Rocznik: 2010
• Numer: nr 5
• Strony: 609--646

Twórcy

autor

Dariusz Rosati

• Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie; Wyższa Szkoła Handlu i Prawa im. Ryszarda Łazarskiego w Warszawie

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