Social Optimum : Part I: Societal Procedures to Realize Stable Collective Decisions

• Autorzy: Tom R. Burns , Ewa Roszkowska

Warianty tytułu

Optimum społeczne : część I: procedury społeczne prowadzące do stabilnych decyzji zbiorowych

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In this paper Generalized Game Theory (GGT), an extension of classical game theory, is applied to the Pareto multi-agent problematique which concerns situations where members of a group, community or society are faced with alternative allocations, institutional arrangements and may collectively choose a particular allocation, institutional arrangement if they can agree on it. Our work replaces the principle of Pareto optimality with the principle of collective decision legitimation. This type of multiple value decision situation is increasingly prevalent not only on the level of societal and political issues but also on the level of many enterprises, for instance, those advocating corporate social responsibility. In particular, the paper identifies and models specific institutionalized regulatory mechanisms that resolve conflicts, such us adjudication, negotiation, voting. (original abstract)

Głównym celem pracy jest prezentacja koncepcji optimum społecznego, będącego pewną alternatywą dla kryterium Pareto. W opracowaniu zasadę optymalności Pareto zastąpiono zasadą podejmowania decyzji zbiorowych zgodnie z uznawalnymi procedurami. Rozważana jest sytuacja, gdy członkowie grupy, społeczności czy organizacji stoją przed problemem podziału zasobów albo zawarcia porozumienia oraz mogą wspólnie dokonać takiego podziału lub zawrzeć porozumienie, jeżeli wyrażą na to zgodę. Do matematycznej formalizacji koncepcji optimum społecznego zastosowano model uogólnionej gry z wykorzystaniem kompleksów reguł. Podstawowe definicje reguły, kompleksu reguł i uogólnionej gry przedstawiono w załączniku. (fragment abstraktu oryginalnego)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Effectiveness; Decision making; Social optimum

PL

Efektywność; Podejmowanie decyzji; Optimum społeczne

• Czasopismo: Współczesne Zarządzanie
• Rocznik: 2010
• Numer: nr 4
• Strony: 9--21

Twórcy

autor

Tom R. Burns

• Stanford University, USA

autor

Ewa Roszkowska

• University of Bialystok, Poland

Bibliografia

• 1. Burns T.R., (1990), Models of Social and Market Exchange: Toward a Sociological Theory of Games and Human Interaction, [w:] C. Calhoun, M.W. Meyer, W.R. Scott (eds.), Structures of Power and Constraint: Essays in Honour of Peter M. Blau, Cambridge University Press, New York.
• 2. Burns T.R., (1994), Two Conceptions of Human Agency: Rational Choice Theory and the Social Theory of Action, [w:] P. Sztompka (ed.), Human Agency and the Reorientation of Social Theory, Gordon and Breach Amsterdam.
• 3. Burns T.R., Baumgartner T., DeVillé P., (1985), Man, Decisions, Society, Gordon and Breach, London/New York.
• 4. Burns T.R., Gomolińska A., (1998), Modeling Social Game Systems by Rule Complexes, [w:] L. Polkowski, A. Skowron (eds.), Rough Sets and Current Trends in Computing, Springer-V, Berlin/Heidelberg.
• 5. Burns T.R., Gomolińska A., (2000), The Theory of Socially Embedded Games: The Mathematics of Social Relationships, Rule Complexes, and Action Modalities, "Quality and Quantity: International Journal of Methodology", Vol. 34 (4).
• 6. Burns T.R., Gomolińska A., (2001), Socio-cognitive Mechanisms of Belief Change: Application of Generalized Game Theory to Belief Revision, Social Fabrication, and Self-fulfilling Prophesy, "Cognitive Systems Research", Vol. 2 (2).
• 7. Burns T.R., Flam H., (1987, reprinted 1990), The Shaping of Social Organization: Social Rule System Theory with Applications, Sage Publications.
• 8. Burns T.R., Roszkowska E., (2005), Generalized Game Theory: Assumptions, Principles, and Elaborations Grounded in Social Theory, in Search of Social Order, "Studies in Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric", Vol. 8 (21).
• 9. Burns T.R., Roszkowska E., (2006a), Economic and Social Equilibria: The Perspective of GGT, "Optimum - Studia Ekonomiczne", No. 3 (31).
• 10. Burns T., Roszkowska E., (2006b), Social Judgement in Multi-Agent Systems: The Perspective Of Generalized Game Theory, [w:] R. Sun (ed.), Cognition and Multi-Agent Interaction. From Modeling to Social Simulation, Cambridge University Press.
• 11. Burns T., Roszkowska E., (2009a), A Social Procedural Approach to the Pareto Optimization Problematique: Part I: Pareto Optimization and its Limitations versus the GGT Conception of the Solution of Multi-value Conflict Problems through Societal Procedures, "Quality& Quantity", Vol. 43, No. 5.
• 12. Burns T., Roszkowska E., (2009b), A Social Procedural Approach to the Pareto Optimization Problematique: Part II. Institutionalized Procedures and their Limitation, "Quality& Quantity", Vol. 43, No. 5.
• 13. Gomolińska A., (1999), Rule Complexes for Representing Social Actors and Interactions, "Studies in Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric", Vol. 3 (16).
• 14. Gomolińska A., (2004), Fundamental Mathematical Notions of the Theory of Socially Embedded Games: A Granular Computing Perspective, [w:] S.K. Pal, L. Polkowski, A. Skowron (eds.), Rough-Neural Computing: Techniques for Computing with Words, Springer-Verlag, Berlin/London.
• 15. Granovetter M., (1985), Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, "American Journal of Sociology", No. 91.
• 16. Ostrom E., (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press.
• 17. Rawls J., (1993), Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York.
• 18. Reiter R., (1980), A Logic for Default Reasoning, "Artificial Intelligence", Vol. 13.
• 19. Scharpf F.W., (1997), Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.