Negocjacje między demonami Laplace'a : czyżby niedoskonałość konkurencji doskonałej?

• Autorzy: Rafał Jakubowski , Paweł Kuśmierczyk

Warianty tytułu

Bargaining between Laplacian Demons : Possible Failure of the Perfect Competition Model?

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Posługując się klasycznym modelem rynku konkurencji doskonałej podjęto próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie o stabilność stanu "zmowy opartej na doskonałej wiedzy" i jej wpływ na podejmowanie decyzji i funkcjonowanie rynków. Opisano także negocjacje rynkowe między demonami Laplace’a.

EN

The article was inspired by the results of the laboratory experiments in which a model of competing producers was analysed. At one point of the experiment gains gathered by the producers were surprisingly close to the ones resulting from cooperation, even though producers did not have an opportunity to set any agreement. Could such an cooperation take place in the markets as a result of the perfect knowledge of all the agents? One of the most important assumptions of the perfect competition model is the one of the perfect rationality and perfect knowledge of the economic agents. If the economic agents, as the model assumes, are Laplacian demons should not each one of them become aware of the gains resulting from the cooperation? And if in this model all agents are perfectly rational and common knowledge exists should not cooperation start spontaneously between Laplacian demons? This analysis leads to the conclusion that assumption of perfect rationality can, in fact, turn the model of perfect competition into bilateral monopoly, with two monopolists as an effect of cooperation on both: the demand and the supply side of the market. If the perfect competition model acts as though it was a bilateral monopoly it turns out that the consequences of the model, especially the ones of the equilibrium price, do not necessarily have to hold, as two monopolists can set the price at the different level, depending on their bargaining power. Further theoretical consequences and possible outcomes are analysed in the paper. The conducted analysis shows that fictitious assumptions of perfect knowledge and rationality can theoretically lead to a situation of no competition and indistinct equilibrium price and hence should not be part of the model which is to depict "the perfect competition". (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Konkurencja doskonała; Gry ekonomiczne; Negocjacje gospodarcze; Taktyki negocjacyjne; Wiedza; Eksperyment badawczy

EN

Perfect competition; Economic games; Economic negotiations; Negotiating tactics; Knowledge; Scientific experiment

• Czasopismo: Prace Naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej we Wrocławiu
• Rocznik: 2005
• Numer: nr 1089 Wpływ aktywności informacyjnej podmiotów na funkcjonowanie rynków
• Strony: 9--22

Twórcy

autor

Rafał Jakubowski

autor

Paweł Kuśmierczyk

Bibliografia

• Axelrod R., The Evolution of Co-operation, Penguin Books 1990.
• Hayek F.A., Indyvidualism and Economic Order, University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London 1948.
• Jakubowski R., Kuśmierczyk P., Narożny M., W poszukiwaniu maksymalnych zysków, Prace Naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej we Wrocławiu nr 1049, AE, Wrocław 2004, s. 64-101.
• Kreps D.M., A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1990.