The pros and cons of rent-seeking: Political rent in various research paradigms

• Autorzy: Stefan Sękowski

Warianty tytułu

Zalety i wady pogoni za rentą. Renta polityczna w różnych paradygmatach badawczych

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This article shows that how we look at political rent and rent-seeking depends on our position on state interference in the economy and which theory of regulation we are familiar with. Although the theory of rent-seeking is in accordance with the paradigm of the private interest (economic) theories of regulation, the researcher also needs an insight based on the public interest theories of regulation if he wants to judge the impact of rent-seeking and the creation of political rent on social wellbeing properly. The paper is also a conceptualization of political rent. It describes forms of rent-seeking and economic systems most amenable to it.(original abstract)

Artykuł ukazuje, że to, jak traktujemy rentę polityczną i pogoń za rentą zależy od nastawienia badacza do ingerencji państwa w gospodarkę oraz od tego, jaka teoria regulacji jest mu bliska. Choć teoria pogoni za rentą koresponduje z teorią regulacji opartą na interesie prywatnym (ekonomiczną), badacz musi uwzględnić także podejście bazujące na teorii regulacji opartej na interesie publicznym, jeśli chce właściwie ocenić wpływ pogoni za rentą i kreacji renty politycznej na dobrobyt społeczny. Artykuł zawiera także konceptualizację renty politycznej. Opisuje też różne formy pogoni za rentą i najbardziej podatne na nią systemy ekonomiczne.(abstrakt oryginalny)

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Capitalism; Politics; Rent-seeking theory

PL

Kapitalizm; Polityka; Teoria pogoni za rentą

• Czasopismo: Studia z Polityki Publicznej / Szkoła Główna Handlowa
• Rocznik: 2021
• Tom: 8
• Numer: nr 2
• Strony: 11--27

Twórcy

autor

Stefan Sękowski

• Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Faculty of Economics, Lublin, Poland

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.33119/KSzPP/2021.2.1