Kartele w trzech perspektywach: neoklasycznej, behawioralnej oraz etycznej

• Autorzy: Adam Karbowski
• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Celem artykułu jest krytyka podejścia neoklasycznego w studiach nad kartelami oraz ukazanie, w jaki sposób perspektywy behawioralna i etyczna rozszerzają a także uzupełniają optykę neoklasyczną. Główny nurt badań ekonomicznych nad problematyką karteli przyjmuje perspektywę neoklasyczną. Z tej tradycji badawczej wyrasta teoria optymalnego zniechęcania, która stanowi podstawę dla obecnej polityki wobec karteli w rozwiniętych krajach świata. Teoria optymalnego zniechęcania stanowi tu punkt wyjścia dla rozważań teoretycznych. Skonfrontowana jest ona następnie z doniesieniami ekonomistów behawioralnych oraz sądami etycznymi na temat funkcjonowania karteli. Analiza behawioralna pozwala wskazać odstępstwa od zachowań przedsiębiorstw przewidywanych na podstawie teorii optymalnego zniechęcania (zakładającej pełną racjonalność, doskonały egoizm oraz całkowitą samokontrolę decydentów). Te behawioralne odstępstwa wynikają z przyczyn wewnętrznych (dyspozycji decydentów) lub czynników środowiskowych. Analiza etyczna rozszerza optykę neoklasyczną. Rozważania aksjologiczne pozwalają pokazać, że działania kartelowe mają nie tylko wymiar czysto ekonomiczny, ale łamią one normy społeczne i mogą zostać uznane na moralnie złe jako przykłady kradzieży oraz oszustwa. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

The paper investigates cartels, or agreements between competing firms that seek to influence prices for certain goods and services by controlling production and marketing. The author examines the neoclassical approach to cartels and proposes two additional approaches, behavioral and ethical, to expand existing research on cartels. Most mainstream studies tend to approach cartels from a neoclassical perspective, according to the author. This research approach gave rise to the so-called optimal deterrence theory, which has become the basis for antitrust policy in highly developed countries, Karbowski notes. The optimal deterrence theory is a point of reference for Karbowski in his article. He compares the optimal deterrence theory with the results of behavioral analyses and ethical reasoning focusing on cartels. According to the author, a behavioral approach makes it possible to show how the behavior of firms deviates from the path delineated by the standard optimal deterrence theory, based on assumptions of full rationality, perfect egoism and complete self-control of decision makers. These behavioral deviations can be explained by either internal (trait-based) or external (environmental) factors, Karbowski says. Ethical analysis makes it possible to expand the neoclassical approach to cartels by showing that cartel behavior can be viewed not only in pure economic terms, but also in terms of theft, deception and cheating, the author argues. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Kartel; Ekonomia neoklasyczna; Ekonomia behawioralna; Etyka działalności gospodarczej

EN

Cartel; Neoclassical economy; Behavioral economics; Business activity ethics

• Czasopismo: Gospodarka Narodowa
• Rocznik: 2015
• Numer: nr 3
• Strony: 5--26

Twórcy

autor

Adam Karbowski

• Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie

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